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INTRODUCTION 
Professor Laurens Walker's The End of the New Deal and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure1 (New Deal's End) is a thought-provoking 
evaluation of the relationship between the New Deal's conclusion and 
modem civil process. Professor Walker canvasses a series of recent, 
puzzling changes which "present the most serious challenge to the 
procedural status quo since the adoption of the original Federal Rules in 
1938."2 The author finds that the New Deal's demise and the rejection of 
that regime's reliance on experts, policies of centralized federal 
decisionmaking, and establishment of the national government as an 
instrument for social reform3 best explain these modifications. Professor 
Walker admonishes proceduralists to accept inevitable political change and 
to consider it when planning reform.4 Asserting that "[m]ajor change in 
political structure and practice requires bold action,"5 the writer calls for 
the creation of a national study group to undertake a searching review of 
civil process and to craft innovative remedies for present difficulties. 6 
Professor Walker provocatively suggests as a fruitful source of solutions 
recent welfare reform, from which he derives purportedly promising 
concepts: waivers of federal strictures, enhanced local control, mandatory 
research, and incentives for better management.7 
New Deal' s End is the latest of Professor Walker's concerted efforts to 
improve procedural revision at the national level and in the ninety-four 
federal district courts. He has scrutinized the processes for amending 
federal and local civil procedures and devised constructive 
recommendations. The author has attacked the processes' pressure points 
while urging relevant decisionmakers, particularly Congress and federal 
judges, to employ the tools of controlled experimentation, administrative 
law, and economic analysis in altering procedure. Professor Walker's 
decade of careful work on these processes spans the very period when 
procedure has become increasingly balkanized. Indeed, that growing 
fragmentation apparently prompted the writer's abandonment of "less 
drastic ways to improve the current system" which he had previously 
championed.8 The above propositions mean that New Deal' s End deserves 
a response. This Essay undertakes that effort. 
1. Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 82 
IOWAL.REV.1269(1997). 
2. Id. at 1271; see id. at 1280-86. 
3. See id. at 1270-71, 1273-86. 
4. See id. at 1286-91. 
5. Id. at 1286. 
6. See id. at 1286-91. 
7. Seeid. 
8. Id. at 1287 (citations omitted). 
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My reply first descriptively and critically assesses Professor Walker's 
account of civil process. I find accurate niuch of his discussion of New 
Deal political principles and their effects on the initial Federal Rules as 
well as how those tenets were rejected or modified. Moreover, procedure 
has recently experienced many enigmatic changes, four of which he 
examines, and they may be the greatest threat to process since the 1930s. 
Nevertheless, Professor Walker seemingly misconceives certain aspects of 
the four alterations, such as their significance and the relevance of the New 
Deal's conclusion to the modifications, and he minimally addresses other 
applicable developments. In short, Professor Walker's reliance on the end 
of the New Deal as an explanation for the changes enables him to recount 
a rather neat story; however, what actually transpired appears more 
complex, subtle and untidy. L therefore, offer complementary explanations 
for the four alterations and different views of their import while 
elaborating his account. 
This response then affords a descriptive and critical evaluation of 
Professor Walker's prescriptions. I consider their scope inadvisable. The 
calls for daring action and for a national commission seem premature 
partly because procedure appears less chaotic and more responsive to 
treatment, especially with conventional measures, than it did three years 
ago when he was writing New Deal' s End. I also find troubling the method 
proffered. Waivers, increased district control, and performance incentives 
could be ineffective. For example, the decentralization and localization 
suggested by Professor Walker would further undermine, and might even 
eviscerate, the federal rule revision process and the national, uniform, and 
simple system of procedure, which has facilitated expeditious, economical 
and fair dispute resolution since 1938. 
Despite the above concerns, Professor Walker's goal of improving 
process and a few ways to attain this objective, such as compulsory 
research, are valuable. Nonetheless, I favor an approach for achieving that 
end through means which are similar, but comparatively moderate and 
potentially more efficacious. Future reform should essentially capitalize on 
the finest dimensions and recalibrate the less effective features of both the 
method recommended in New Deal' s End and the traditional amendment 
processes. Illustrative are exhaustion of these conventional mechanisms, 
somewhat enhanced reliance on local entities, and continued emphasis on 
existing national institutions that have responsibility for procedure. This 
approach would increase district experimentation with promising 
measures, while it could revitalize and maintain the federal revision 
process and the national, consistent, and simple procedural scheme which 
has served Congress, the courts, and the nation well for sixty years. 
Implementation of these suggestions would eliminate or at least 
ameliorate many complications in modem process which apparently led 
Professor Walker to write New Deal's End. If my proposals prove 
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inefficacious, there will be time enough at the outset of the twenty-first 
century to institute relatively extreme measures, namely the bold action 
that Professor Walker advocates. In sum, as procedure approaches the 
millennium, less millennial approaches may be warranted.9 
I. DESCRIPTIVE AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT IN NEW VEAL'S END 
In this Part, I descriptively and critically analyze each constituent in 
Professor Walker's explanation of current process. Consensus accompanies 
much in his account, although disagreement, uncertainty, and even 
controversy attend some of its aspects, partly because there are insufficient 
empirical data on which to premise conclusive determinations. I, thus, 
adumbrate this description by exploring additional explanations for the 
four alterations emphasized and different views of their importance and by 
assessing other significant phenomena. 
A The New Deal and Its End 
Professor Walker first examines essential New Deal political 
principles-use of experts, centralized decisionmaking policies, and the 
federal government's establishment as an agent of social reform-and 
explains how they eventually fell out of favor or came to be changed.10 The 
author concomitantly evaluates these precepts' impacts on the 1938 
Federal Rules. For instance, he shows how Congress delegated authority 
for adopting the Rules to the Supreme Court, which created an Advisory 
Committee (Advisory or Civil Rules Committee) comprised of 
distinguished law professors and practitioners and charged the expert entity 
with developing proposed measures.11 The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 
correspondingly centralized at the national level all procedure governing 
civil litigation in the federal district courts.12 The Federal Rules which the 
Advisory Committee drafted also enabled the courts to serve as vehicles 
for social change.13 
9. This is partly an apologia and an effort to advance dialogue. Professor Walker graciously 
cites my work for certain ideas, which may have been unclear, tentative or eclipsed by later 
developments. See infra notes 16, 38 & 83 (showing my involvement in changes). 
10. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1272-80. 
11. See id. at 1273; see also Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity 
and Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774 (1934). See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered 
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
909, 971-72 (1987). 
12. SeePub.L.No. 73-415,48Stat 1064(codifiedasamendedat28 U.S.C. § 2072(1994)); 
see also Walker, supra note 1, at 1276-77. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling 
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). 
13. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1279; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Federal Rules Fifty 
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There is some consensus regarding this account. For example, 
numerous writers believe that the New Deal influenced the original Rules, 
that Congress centralized civil process, and that the expert Advisory 
Committee suggested a regime which permitted the courts to be social 
reform agents.14 However, certain features of the description are disputed. 
For instance, the system that Congress prescribed, the Committee 
proposed, and the Court adopted did not necessarily dictate the 
centralization of all procedural decisions, while initial Rule 83 expressly 
authorized districts to apply local measures which fostered 
decentralization. The three core New Deal principles may be less 
disfavored than the author claims, but even if they are, the concepts 
apparently retain greater applicability to process and federal courts than to 
welfare and states. 
B. Four Puzzling Procedural Changes 
Professor W alkerthen analyzes what he characterizes as four "puzzling 
reversals of prior practice" in federal civil procedure which have occurred 
over the last two decades.15 The writer concomitantly observes that the 
conclusion of the New Deal affords a general explanation for this series of 
important modifications and that the proposition can be employed to guide 
constructive future reform. 
1. Local Procedural Proliferation 
Professor Walker asserts that the first enigmatic change commenced 
during the late 1970s when federal districts prescribed increasing numbers 
of local strictures.16 He reports that the Judicial Conference of the United 
States responded to proliferation by commissioning a study which found 
that the courts had applied more than 5,000 local procedures, many of 
which contravened the Federal Rules or legislation.17 Professor Walker 
contends that the 1988 Judicial hnprovements and Access to Justice Act 
Years Later: Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2241-44 (1989). 
14. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. cm. 
L. REV. 494, 502-05 (1986); Subrin, supra note 11, at 944-48; Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation 
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNEILL. REV. 270, 273-77 (1989). 
15. Walker, supra note 1, at 1280. 
16. See id. at 1280-81; see also Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of 
Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1394-1400 (1992). I served on a Ninth Circuit 
committee which analyzed proliferation. See infra note 132; Tobias, supra. 
17. See Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conf. of the U.S. Report of the 
Local Rules Project. Local Rules on Civil Practice (1989); see also Walker, supra note 1, at 1280-
81. The Conference is the federal courts' policymaking arm. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994). 
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(JIA)18 "significantly altered the process of making local rules [by] 
requiring district courts to appoint advisory committees to assist judges in 
writing local rules."19 He cites my work for the idea that "Congress 
essentially substituted forthe Civil Rules Committee ninety-four relatively 
amateur entities" and describes this conclusion as "striking because it 
suggests the original Rules project has been undermined."20 New Deal's 
End claims that proliferation evinces.growing doubts regarding the efficacy 
of centralization and that the JIA's citizen participation requirements 
evidence legislative rejection of expertise.21 
There is considerable agreement about this account's general contours, 
namely that local measures have increased, but dispute attends several 
particulars. For example, the local requirements actually appeared soon 
after the initial Rules' adoption and gradually expanded until the 1970s 
when districts prescribed mounting numbers of procedures under the rubric 
of judicial case management to treat escalating caseloads.22 Proliferation 
might indicate some concern regarding centralization's effectiveness, and 
a few districts may have been addressing the national revisors' perceived 
unresponsiveness to their need for tools which would efficaciously resolve 
growing dockets.23 Nevertheless, many courts adopted strictures to 
experiment with promising mechanisms, to treat unusual, problematic local 
conditions, and for numerous, otherreasons as idiosyncratic as the peculiar 
interests or predilections of judges, lawyers, or litigants in specific districts. 
The JIA' s public involvement requirements could correspondingly reflect 
disavowal of expertise, but they may show congressional appreciation that 
citizen input can improve proposals for procedural change by providing 
new information and different perspectives. 
Professor Walker's assertions that local rules committees would 
significantly modify local revision, replace the Advisory Committee, and 
erode the Rules project have not yet materialized. Many local committees 
18. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of28 U.S.C.). 
19. Walker, supra note 1, at 1281; see Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure for the 
Twenty-First Century (1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); see also 28 U.S.C. § 
2077 (1988). 
20. Tobias, supra note 16, at 1400; see Walker, supra note 1, at 1281. ''Yet, this significant 
development lacks ... an explanation that can guide reform." Walker, supra, at 1281. 
21. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1285; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: 
Mandatory lnfonnal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 830 (1991). 
22. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. 
J. L. RER>RM 647, 675-78 (1988); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: 
Unifonnity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2016-18 
(1989); see also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
23. I rely, in this and the next sentence, on Subrin, supra note 22, at 2018-26; Carl Tobias, 
Some Realism About Federal Procedural Refonn, 49 Fu.. L. REV. 49, 58-62 (1997). 
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have been quiescent or even moribund, often deferring to advisory groups 
appointed under the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990, while the 
JIA which he argues fostered proliferation also expressly mandated its 
reduction.24 The Advisory Committee has continued to study the Rules and 
suggest changes, as indicated. Illustrative are the 1993 amendments, the 
most ambitious set of revisions ever adopted, which included a major 
amendment of Rule 11 's 1983 revision and a local option provision that 
permitted districts to vary applicable federal requirements; the 1996 
proposal to amend Rule 23; and the revisors' recent decisions to 
commission empirical analyses of discovery and to eliminate opt-outs and 
to amend the discovery rules after receiving the results.25 
2. Congressional Rulemaking 
Professor Walker finds that the second alteration began in the 1980s 
when Congress abandoned its forty-year practice of deferring to other 
revision entities and directly amended the Rules. 26 The writer reports that 
lawmakers revised Rule 37 to authorize fee and expense awards when the 
United States violates discovery provisions; Rule 4 to release federal 
marshals from routine service of process duties; and Rule 35 to permit 
mental examinations by psychologists who are not doctors.27 However, he 
considers most significant the 1995 passage of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) which purportedly amends Rule 23 in five 
ways, dramatically limiting the class action's scope and implementing for 
"securities litigation a novel and complex structure quite different from 
Rule 23."28 Professor Walker claims that "intervention on this scale 
suggests a major change in legislative perception of the Rules project," 
while it reflects rejection of the national revisors' expertise and new-found 
confidence in Congress's ability to "fashion complex civil rules dealing 
with important substantive topics."29 
24. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1600-01, 1628-29 (1994); see also infra text accompanying notes 45, 126, 
130-33 (suggesting apparent expiration ofCJRA and most groups and citing JIA mandates). 
25. See Amendments toFederalRulesofCivilProcedure, 146 F.R.D.401 (1993); infra notes 
36-37, 48-50, 53, 60-62 and accompanying text. 
26. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1281-83; see also Tobias, supra note 24, at 1598. 
27. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1282. 
28. Id. at 1283; see Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1-77z-2, 
78j-l, 78u-5i (Supp. I 1995)); see also Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 
38 ARiz. L. REV. 717 (1996). The PSLRA may actually be more significant because it amends nine 
Federal Rules. 
29. Walker, supra note l,at 1283, l285;seealsoHearing BeforeHouseJudiciarySubcomm. 
on Courts & Intellectual Property Federal Judiciary Oversight: Protecting Small Business, 105th 
Cong. (1998) (statement of Judge William T. Hodges) (criticizing 25 bills in this Congress that 
would directly amend Rules). 
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Consensus, especially as to increased legislative amendment, 
accompanies this broad outline, but differences exist, particularly regarding 
intervention's significance. For example, there were only three direct 
revisions during the 1980s, two of which tinkered with Rules 37 and 35.30 
Rule 4's 1983 amendment was apparently so flawed that the Supreme 
Court revamped it in 1993, an alteration to which Congress acquiesced.31 
The author may also overstate the PSLRA's importance, although he 
correctly observes that the law is the most significant example of direct 
revision. For instance, since the 1960s, provisions in much social 
legislation, such as civil rights and environmental statutes, have modified 
procedure to facilitate litigation by the Acts' intended beneficiaries. 32 
Professor Walker correspondingly contends that intervention of the 
magnitude witnessed by the PSLRA indicates a profound change in 
Congress's view of the Rules project, suggesting disavowal of the revisors' 
expertise and greater self-assurance that it can craft sophisticated strictures 
for complex areas. 33 However, his assertions might accord lawmakers too 
much credit. Most did not consider, or only dimly perceived, these ideas 
in voting, while adoption appears attributable more to the securities, 
accounting, and other affected interests that drafted critical portions of the 
PSLRA and orchestrated a gargantuan lobbying effort which narrowly 
secured passage, 34 or to the fulfillment of promises in the Contract With 
America (Contract) when the Republican Party captured control of 
Congress.35 
It is important to remember that lawmakers did not approve other 
central legal reforms in the Contract or significant rule revision proposals 
in the 1990s, even as they enacted the PSLRA. For instance, Congress 
refused to pass the Attorney Accountability Act, which would have 
fundamentally amended Rule 11 soon after its major 1993 revision.36 
Congress also rejected a concerted campaign to amend Rule ll's 1993 
revision which reversed the provision's 1983 amendment, the most 
30. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (1993 amendment); see also Paul D. Carrington, Continuing Work 
on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NO'l'RE DAME L. REV. 733 (1988). This undercuts the claim 
of new-found confidence, but it did occur a dozen years before the PSLRA's passage. 
32. Provisions govern standing, intervention and fee shifting. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 
(1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604, 9613 (1994); see also John Leubsdorf, 
Class Actions at the Cloverleaf, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 453, 453-55 (1997). 
33. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1283, 1285. 
34. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. 
REY. 497, 515 (1997); Carl Tobias, Refonning Common Sense Legal Refonns, 30 CONN. L. REV. 
537, 550-53 (1998); see also Seligman, supra note 28. 
35. SeeCarlTobias,CommonSenseand0therLegalRefonns,48VAND.L.REv.699(1995). 
36. See H.R. 988, 104th Cong. (1995); see also Tobias, supra note 35, at 721-24, 729-31; 
Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J.171 (1994). 
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controversial alteration in the Federal Rules' history.37 
3. Mandatory Local Reform 
Professor Walker considers the third puzzling reversal to be the 1990 
CJRA "which invited wholesale local modifications of the Rules"38 by 
requiring all ninety-four districts to establish advisory groups comprised 
of counsel and parties who would draft a plan with cost and delay 
reduction procedures.39 The author credits Professor Linda Mullenix for 
identifying the Act's "truly remarkable structural" ramifications:40 
"Congress has taken procedural rulemaking power away from judges and 
their expert advisors and delegated it to local lawyers."41 He claims that 
plan strictures differ across districts and with the Federal Rules, thus 
continuing the decentralization movement commenced by local 
proliferation; intimates that the advisory groups displace the Civil Rules 
Committee; and argues that Congress dramatically altered basic court 
rulemaking by assigning responsibility to local entities instead of 
legislating rules.42 
There is consensus about the general description of compulsory local 
reform, but the specifics are rather controversial. Perhaps most important, 
Professor Walker seems to overstate the CJRA' s purposes and effects. 
First, Congress prescribed instrumentalities consisting of local attorneys 
and litigants to capitalize on expertise and ingenuity in the districts as well 
as a core set of identical principles, guidelines, and techniques.43 Second, 
most advisory groups did little after submitting their recommendations, 
some of which judges rejected, while few courts adopted dissimilar 
measures or ones that conflicted with the Federal Rules, aggressively 
applied strictures in plans once promulgated, or fully complied with other 
37. See H.R. 2979, 103d Cong. (1993); see also S. 400, 105th Cong. (1997); William J. 
Hughes, Reflections from the House: Congressional Reaction to the 1993 Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 SETON HAILLEGIS. J. 1, 1-2 (1993). 
38. Walker, supra note 1, at 1283; see also Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994)); Tobias, supra note 16, 
at 1394. I serve on the District of Montana CJRA advisory group and have written on the CJRA. 
See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 24, at 1628-29. 
39. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1283; see also 28 U.S.C.§§ 471-473, 478; Tobias, supra 
note 24, at 1602-04. 
40. Walker, supra note l, at 1283-84; cf. Lauren K. Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil 
Justice RefonnAct of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1994). 
41. Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Refonnation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 
375, 379 (1992); see also Walker, supra note l, at 1284. 
42. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1284; see also supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 
43. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 473, 478; see also Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congress and the Courts: Our 
Mutual Obligation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1285 (1994); Tobias, supra note 16, at 1418-20. Senator 
Biden was chair of the Judiciary Committee and the CJRA's chief sponsor. 
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CJRA commands, such as mandates for preparing annual assessments.44 
Third, Congress apparently intended that statutorily-prescribed groups and 
mechanisms would expire with experimentation's conclusion, and 
enforcement today is extremely limited. 45 These local entities and 
measures, therefore, have minimally threatened the national revision 
institutions which have continued to study the Rules and suggest 
amendments, when warranted,46 and the uniform, simple procedural 
regime. 
In short, the CJRA as written was a modest reform, and many districts 
rather narrowly implemented it. The legislation, thus, constitutes no real 
change and will clearly have a less profound impact on the national 
revisors, the amendment process, and the Federal Rules than Professor 
W alk:er predicts, particularly if the CJRA has expired and if the provisions 
in the 1988 JIA and Rule 83 which proscribe local proliferation receive 
application.47 
4. Optional Rules 
The fourth alteration that Professor Walker identifies is the 1993 
amendments which authorize districts to "opt-out" of requirements in the 
Federal Rules.48 Half of the courts seemed to eschew the national strictures 
governing mandatory pre-discovery disclosure.49 The author relies on 
Professor Lauren Robel' s work for the ideas that optional provisions 
suggest the Advisory Committee's "lack of commitment" to a controversial 
revision and "represent starkly the lack of consensus about even the most 
fundamental aims of our procedural system."50 He declares that opt-outs 
continue the decentralization trend seen in proliferation and that "[t]his 
notable rejection of centralization and expertise requires a rationale."51 
There is considerable agreement that the optional provisions posed 
difficulty. However, it is unclear exactly how problematic they were. The 
opt-outs may reflect justifiable concern regarding the efficacy of the highly 
controversial disclosure technique or commendable deference to 
44. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Refonn Sunset, 1998 U. Iu.. L. REV. 547; Edward D. 
Cavanagh, Congress' Failed Attempt to Spur Efficiency: The Legacy of the Civil Justice Refonn 
Act, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 1996, at 28; see also 28 U.S.C. at§§ 472, 475. 
45. See Biden, supra note 43; Tobias, supra note 44; infra notes 130..33 and accompanying 
text; see also supra text accompanying note 34. 
46. See supra note 25 and accompanying text 
47. See infra notes 69, 126-33 and accompanying text. I have moderated my earlier views that 
the CJRA might have more lasting effect See Tobias, supra note 16; Tobias, supra note 24. 
48. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1284; see also Lauren K. Robel, Mandatory Disclosure and 
Local Abrogation: In Search of a Theory for Optional Rules, 14 REv. LmG. 49, 50 (1994). 
49. See Walker, supra note l, at 1284. Many "substituted other disclosure rules." Id. 
50. Robel, supra note 48, at 51; see also Walker, supra note 1, at 1284-85. 
51. Walker, supra note 1, at 1285. 
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Congress's passage of the CJRA and to ongoing experimentation with 
various disclosure mechanisms, which was an effective way to develop the 
best procedure, rather than doubts about centralization and expertise.52 
Moreover, the revisors recently rectified the complications that the optional 
provisions created by sponsoring empirical studies and proposing the opt-
outs' elimination and the reinstitution of national discovery requirements, 
which arguably signify what Professor Walker might term renewed 
commitments to centralization and expertise.53 The opt-outs' truncated 
existence and limited application to several aspects of discovery in some 
districts, mean that they were primarily symbolic. 
C. The End of the New Deal 
Professor Walker concludes the third part of New Deal's End with 
numerous illustrations of how the rejection of the New Deal's central 
tenets-expertise, centralization and the federal government as an agent of 
social reform-explain the four modifications emphasized, while be 
proclaims that "[t]he end of the New Deal provides a general explanation 
for the recent puzzling changes in federal civil rule structure."54 
The author suggests that disavowal of expertise explicates certain 
alterations. For instance, be finds rejection of the delegation to experts of 
responsibility for rule revision in direct amendment.55 Professor Walker 
correspondingly contends that legislative refutation of expertise partially 
explains the major intervention in rule revision witnessed by the PSLRA' s 
striking Rule 23 provisos.56 Moreover, be considers expertise's disavowal 
a powerful explanation for the 1988 JIA's strictures promoting public 
participation in rule amendment and for Congress's trust in "representative 
group[s] of citizens assembled on a district-by-district basis."57 
Professor Walker also asserts that doubts involving centralization 
afford insights into some modifications. The author finds that these 
concerns paralleled proliferation's growth, while the decentralization 
movement begun by proliferation received impetus from widely divergent 
52. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Leaming from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need 
Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 304-06 (1994); John B. Oakley, An Open Letter on Reforming the 
Process of Revising the Federal Rules, 55 Mom-. L. REV. 435, 437-38 (1994). 
53. See Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 179 F.R.D. 357 (1998); see also infra note 
122 and accompanying text; Walker, supra note l, at 1285-86. 
54. Walker, supra note l, at 1285. I addressed above some of these examples; hence, 
footnoted, rather than textual, responses are warranted here. Compare supra notes 21, 29 and 
accompanying text with infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
55. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1285; see also supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text. 
56. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1285-86; see also supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text. 
57. Walker, supra note 1, at 1285; see also supra text accompanying notes 19-25, 38-47. 
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CJRA reform plans which increased local measures and additionally 
balkanized procedure. 58 The writer detects "further clear evidence of doubt 
about the benefits of centralization" in the novel 1993 opt-out rules which 
continue the trend.59 
Professor Walker argues that concerns respecting the proper role of the 
federal government in social reform enhance comprehension. He considers 
illustrative the first proposed revision in Rule 23 since its major 1966 
amendment60 and claims that the new form of class action meant only to 
facilitate settlement, if adopted, will be the most significant revision in 
three decades. 61 The author finds that doubts about the federal government 
and courts as reform agents explain the measure's support for settlement 
which would diminish judges' opportunities to conduct active 
policymaking through the adjudication of disputes.62 
The most instructive example of Professor Walker's reliance on the 
New Deal's end as an explanation is his contention that proliferation, 
CJRA mandatory local reform, and the 1993 optional rules evince 
centralization's rejection and "suggest that federal civil practice is now 
much more than before a matter of local determination, a situation 
consistent with the analysis of contemporary politics."63 However, the 
rather favorable prospects for limiting proliferation, the CJRA' s modest 
commands, narrow effectuation and apparent expiration in 1997, and the 
national revisors' recent decision to rescind opt-outs64 have several 
implications. They show that the writer may overstate what in fact has 
happened, that the developments were principally symbolic, and that any 
movement toward localism is one of degree and clearly no paradigm shift, 
while the New Deal's demise apparently has limited explanatory force.65 
D. Summary By Way of Friendly Critique 
This illustration, and a number of additional examples which I 
examined in considering the four puzzling reversals, and the New Deal's 
conclusion as the reason for them, indicate certain difficulties with 
58. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1285; see also supra text accompanying notes 16-25, 38-47. 
59. Walker, supra note 1, at 1285; see also supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text 
60. See Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 559 (1996); see also Walker, 
supra note 1, at 1286. 
61. See 167 F.R.D. at 559; see also Walker, supra note 1, at 1286. See generally 
Symposium, Mass Tortes: Serving Up Just Desserts, 80 CORNEILL. REV. 811 (1995). 
62. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1286; see also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE 
L.J. 1073 (1984); Resnik, supra note 14, at 528-29, 549-51; Symposium: The Institute of Judicial 
Administration Research Conference on Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
63. Walker, supra note l, at 1285; see also supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text 
64. See supra notes 44-46, 53, infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text. 
65. I had concerns about localism, but recent events moderated its effects. See supra note 9. 
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Professor Walker's descriptive account. One important complication is the 
author's valiant but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to afford a single 
explanation for procedure's current condition. 
The story of modem process, comprising a complex constellation of 
phenomena, is richer and subtler as well as more dynamic and fragmented 
than New Deal' s End intimates. Perhaps most trenchant are the apparently 
conflicting, or at least mixed, developments in procedure over the last two 
decades. For example, Congress addressed proliferation with the 1988 JIA 
but exacerbated it with the 1990 CJRA and partially amended numerous 
rules by passing the 1995 PSLRA, even while rejecting direct revision of 
Rule 11 's 1993 amendment during the 103rd and 104th Congresses and of 
many other Rules in the 1990s.66 During 1983, the Supreme Court revised 
Rules 11, 16, and 26 to codify and facilitate the managerial judging which 
districts had conducted with proliferating strictures since the 1970s.67 In 
1993, the Justices substantially changed Rule 11 's 1983 amendment, 
significantly modified the 1983 revisions of Rules 16 and 26, and adopted 
the opt-out provisions that fostered proliferation.68 During 1985 and 1995, 
the Court amended Rule 83 in an effort to reduce proliferation.69 During 
1998, the national revisors proposed altering Rule 26 again and eliminating 
opt-outs.70 
These and numerous additional actions which New Deal' s End treats 
or which I explore above demonstrate that "procedural progress" is 
ephemeral and incremental, often constituting two steps forward and one 
step back, lateral movements, and occasional reversals.71 The 
developments illustrate the difficulty in fully apprehending a number of 
recent events, particularly by overestimating their importance, because the 
actions can be aberrations or temporary detours or have more symbolic 
than practical impact. For instance, Congress has directly amended two 
insignificant provisions and the Supreme Court overhauled the 1983 
legislative revision of Rule 4 a decade later, while even the PSLRA, which 
is broader and could have actual effect, partially amended certain rules 
only in securities litigation.72 The CJRA' s limited mandates, circumscribed 
66. See supra notes 28-29, 35-43, infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text 
67. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1095, 1095-1104 (1983); 
supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text 
68. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. at 419-47; see also 
supra notes 35-36, 48-51 and accompanying text 
69. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83, 1985 & 1995 amendments; see also Tobias, supra note 19. 
70. See supra note 53 and accompanying text The 1996 proposal to amend rule 23 to 
facilitate settlement has not advanced beyond the Advisory Committee. See supra notes 60-62 and 
accompanying text 
71. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater. The Prospects for Procedural 
Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 812-23 (1993); see also Marcus, supra note 22, at 675-78. 
72. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text 
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implementation and ostensible expiration, and the 1993 opt-outs' 
apparently restricted application may mean that they were exceptions, brief 
diversions, or largely symbolic.73 The history of process might well be a 
"series of attempts to solve the problems created by the preceding 
generation's procedural reforms."74 
Professor Walker's effort to impose order upon, much less offer a lone 
explanatory theory for, so many fluid and diffuse, albeit interrelated, 
developments is correspondingly fraught with peril.75 Each has multiple 
sources, to some of which he does not advert and others of which are · 
difficult to isolate, allow for, or identify.76 illustrative is proliferation. 
Districts may have applied strictures to resolve increasing cases, to remedy 
peculiar, local complications, or to experiment with promising 
measures-ideas that seem tangentially related to the end of the New 
Deal--or for numerous, additional reasons which resist felicitous 
delineation. 77 In the final analysis, one overarching idea, even a concept as 
creative and capacious as the New Deal' s demise, cannot capture all of the 
forces that have animated the process since the 1970s. 
Despite these concerns, Professor Walker realizes considerable success 
because his thought-provoking description clarifies comprehension of 
procedure. Indeed, members of Congress and the federal judiciary as well 
as scholars have found troubling, and have attempted to address, the four 
reversals, while many observers agree with much else, such as growing 
balkanization, which he describes.78 Unfortunately, certain ways that the 
author apparently misperceives modern process might have led him to 
develop inadvisable recommendations. 
II. DESCRIPTIVE AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
PRESCRIPTIONS IN NEW DEAL'S END 
In the last section of his article, Professor Walker derives insights from 
recent political events to specify reform' s scope and method.79 The writer 
urges proceduralists to accept inevitable political change and consider it 
when planning reform but candidly admits that they may differ about how 
73. See supra notes 44-53, 64-65 and accompanying text. 
74. Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REY. 837, 1030 (1984). 
75. See generally Walker, supra note 1. 
76. See id. 
77. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Caution is also warranted in extrapolating from 
the four changes or the New Deal's end to generalize about procedure. 
78. See, e.g., Avem Cohn, A Judge's View of Congressional Action Affecting the Courts, 54 
LAW & CONTEMP. PR.OBS. 99, 99 (1991); Hughes, supra note 37, at 3-8; Stephen C. Yeazell, The 
Misunderstood Consequences of Modem Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REY. 631. 
79. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1289-90. 
1999) FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 655 
to do so. 80 The lack of empirical data and temporal perspective on relevant 
developments and their complex, dynamic nature confound efforts to 
assess his proposals. However, I can evaluate them by identifying the 
principal problems for which he posits suggestions. 
A Scope 
When examining reform's scope, Professor Walker asserts that 
"[m]ajor change in political structure and practice requires bold action" 
and calls for a national commission or study entity to canvass present 
process and to formulate recommendations for improvement. 81 The author 
modestly finds that "less drastic ways to improve the current system," 
some of which he had earlier proffered, may be insufficient, that "the case 
for fundamental review is now powerful [, and that] the changed political 
circumstances suggest the need for a general review by some group 
different from the bodies currently employed."82 By way of contrast, he 
considers and deems deficient two recent endeavors which traditional 
entities undertook. Professor Walker claims that proposals developed in a 
rule revision survey by the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (Standing Committee) "seem[] unlikely to produce 
much effective reform."83 The writer believes that most of the 
prescriptions, which implicate only management of the existing process are 
narrow and fail to address the critical difficulties posed by the altered 
political situation while finding several inadequate. 84 He similarly 
characterizes the Guidelines for Drafting and Editing Court Rules, a 
"'blackletter statement of principles' for modem rule-drafting," as 
unresponsive to recent political changes because they focus on style.85 
There is consensus about certain features of his recommendations. 
Numerous federal courts observers agree that many complications, which 
are problematic enough to warrant remediation, plague modem procedure 
and have attempted to craft solutions. 86 Several people have urged that 
some study group conduct a basic analysis or have proposed moving 
80. See id. at 1286. 
81. Id. at 1286-87. 
82. Id. at 1287. His ideas remain saJient. would be improvements, and should be applied. 
83. Id.; see Subcomm. on Long Range Planning, Comm. on Rules of Practice, Procedure and 
Evidence of the JudiciaJ Conf. of the U.S., A Self-Study of Federal JudiciaJ Rulemaking, 168 
F.R.D. 679, 683-84 (1995); id. at 695 n.50 (showing my participation). 
84. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1287-88. 
85. Id. at 1288; see also Bryan A. Gamer, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 
Guidelines for Drafting and Editing Court Rules (1996). 
86. See Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 
DUKE L.J. 929 (1996); Mullenix, supra note 41, at 379; Robel, supra note 48, at 49-50; see also 
supra note 78. 
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outside the ordinary rule revision process. 87 Few would quarrel with 
Professor Walker's contention that the efforts of conventional entities 
discussed above will lead to meaningful reform. 
Disagreement does attend other aspects of the suggestions. His calls for 
bold action and for a searching study appear premature because process 
seems less splintered and more settled and amenable to remediation than 
it was in 1996 when he authored New Deal's End. For instance, a recent 
Ninth Circuit review of fifteen districts' measures has promise for 
curtailing proliferation, and many courts no longer employ entities or 
mechanisms prescribed under the CJRA, which has essentially expired. 88 
Congress's acute disinterest in resolving the CJRA's fate suggests that 
Congress is less disposed to make procedural policy. The national revisors' 
empirical studies of discovery and their new proposal for amending the 
discovery provisions and abolishing opt-outs may manifest revitalized 
commitments to expertise, centralization, uniformity, and recapturing 
primary responsibility for process. 89 
In short, procedure today is not perfect or even greatly improved, but 
it does appear less turbulent and fractured, and more responsive to 
treatment, than in recent years. The prospects for solving or at least 
ameliorating the major difficulties with process seem considerably better. 
It, therefore, appears preferable at this juncture to exhaust the existing 
mechanisms for modifying procedure. 
B. Method 
Professor Walker urges that a study group explore contemporary 
models to reconfigure the Federal Rules by capitalizing on post-New Deal 
restructuring in other fields. He offers the example of welfare reform, 
which purportedly shares important similarities with the Rules in the 
context of New Deal politics: both "were centralized in the national 
government during the 1930s, [were] designed by a small group of experts 
and ... enhanced the federal role in social reform."90 Measures for 
adjusting welfare programs to new political realities, thus, might receive 
analogous application to the Rules and yield "four strong candidates ... : 
the use of waivers, enhanced local control, mandatory research, and use of 
incentives. "91 
87. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a 
Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 854-55 (1993); Carl Tobias, More Modem Civil Process, 56 
U. Prrr. L. REV. 801, 839 (1995). 
88. See supra notes 44-45, infra notes 126·29, 132 and accompanying text. 
89. See supra note 53, infra notes 126, 136·38 and accompanying text. But see supra note 
29. 
90. Walker, supra note 1, at 1288 (citations omitted). 
91. Id. at 1289. 
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The author explains that waivers facilitate short-term change by 
permitting exceptions from generally applicable national requirements. 92 
Increased district control accommodates long-term modification by 
assigning non-federal entities responsibility for implementation's specifics, 
subject to national oversight that assures a degree of local similarity.93 
Research mandates accord the alteration a practical dimension, while 
incentives encourage attempts to satisfy policy goals.94 Professor Walker 
finds these concepts particularly attractive because they should foster 
needed change by diminishing the focus on disputed political values.95 
He next applies the method's four features to procedural reform.96 First, 
legislation could authorize districts to waive federal rules with approval of 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Administrative 
Office), thereby expanding local control yet preserving national 
oversight.97 Second, over time a series of waivers might increase 
delegation, subject to several limitations. 98 For example, individual courts 
could prescribe their own procedures restrained only by certain general 
principles, such as notice pleading or liberal discovery.99 The author 
contends that this approach would permit the enforcement of broad federal 
policies but afford enhanced flexibility to treat local · conditions and 
experiment. 100 Third, a statute might include research commands and even 
suggest appropriate methodologies.101 For instance, courts which assemble 
information according to designated techniques could modify specific 
rules.102 Fourth, incentives might be employed to encourage enterprise in 
case resolution by, for example, lifting federal strictures when districts 
demonstrate successful docket management.103 
There is some consensus about various facets of the method 
recommended.104 A few legal scholars have endorsed, albeit in principle, 
the precepts of increased local control and mandatory research105 or 




96. See id. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. 
99. See id. Another possibility, "requir[ing] conformity to local state procedure,'' would 
produce interstate uniformity. Id. at 1290 n.180; see also Subrin, supra note 22, at 2005-11. 
100. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1290. 
101. See id. at 1291. 
102. See id. 
103. See id. 
104. See id. 
105. See, e.g., A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1590-93 (1991); see also Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of 
Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683 (1998). 
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ancillary features, such as the notion that empirical data should underlie 
federal rule revision.106 Indeed, these ideas were integral to the 1991 
proposed amendment of Rule 83 which the national revisors withdrew out 
of respect for contemporaneous CJRA testing.107 
However, disagreement and controversy attend the method. As general 
matters, waivers, enhanced local control, and incentives could impose a 
system which is an administrative and practical nightmare and even a 
prescription for chaos. For instance, CJRA implementation suggests, and 
Professor Walker recognizes, that districts and their advisors might rely on 
the three concepts to apply measures which are more solicitous of the 
needs of local judges, lawyers, and parties than of national uniformity and 
simplicity, thus compounding balkanization.108 
Each of the "four strong candidates" would apparently entail 
disadvantages.Waivers, increased local control, and incentives that permit 
the removal of federal requirements could undermine the national, 
consistent simple regime of procedure embodied in the original Rules 
which has facilitated prompt, inexpensive and fair dispute resolution.109 For 
example, an incentive structure that rewards courts which "successfully 
manage" litigation by excusing their enforcement of federal strictures 
might be less equitable because more or faster dispositions may not 
produce fairer substantive results or because it could deprive parties of the 
procedural tools that they need to prove cases.110 A scheme which 
encourages all ninety-four districts to secure removal or waivers of the 86 
Federal Rules at different times also means that disparate requirements 
might govern litigation in every court and that the entire system could be 
in perpetual flux. 
The prospects for enlarging local control but maintaining national 
oversight, especially through the Administrative Office, are not very 
auspicious. Limited, and perhaps failed, effectuation of similar monitoring 
under the CJRA and the JIA by the Judicial Conference and circuit review 
106. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank. The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The 
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927-28 (1989); Samuel Estreicher, Foreword: 
Federal Class Actions After 30 Years, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1996). 
107. See Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Proposed Rules: 
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal 
Rules ofEvidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 153 (1991). 
108. See Carrington, supra note 86, at 963-64; Tobias, supra note 16, at 1405-06; see also 
supra notes 19-21, 41-43 and accompanying text 
109. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level 
of Rule: The Example of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure l, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1325 (1995); Resnik, 
supra note 14, at 502-15; Tobias, supra note 14, at 272-77. 
110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also Cohn, supra note 78, at 99; Lauren K. Robel, The Politics 
of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 115 (1991); Tobias, supra note 16, 
at 1422-27; Tobias, supra note 24, at 1602. 
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entities, institutions which are comprised of Article III judges, inspire little 
confidence in the Administrative Office which has less independence, 
while the Advisory Committee's proposed 1991 amendment of Rule 83 
lodged analogous responsibility in the Conference. m 
CJRA experimentation correspondingly indicates that greater district 
control would worsen the above problems, namely fragmentation, and 
introduce others, such as erosion of national rule revision.112 Local 
procedure would become more diverse among the ninety-four courts and 
depart further from the Federal Rules. The difficulty of finding, mastering, 
and satisfying different local measures would increase civil cases' 
complexity and expense and would frustrate efforts of lawyers and parties 
to litigate in multiple districts. Federal mandates' waiver and removal and 
enhanced local control, thus, might well prove more disruptive than opt-
outs. 
The research provisions prescribed seem constructive because reliance 
on empirical material that evaluators have systematically collected, 
analyzed and synthesized should improve the quality of proposals for 
modifying procedure. However, numerous districts may lack the requisite 
expertise and resources to design and complete the type of research 
projects which Professor Walker envisions. 
The method that New Deal's End suggests, therefore, would 
significantly complicate federal civil practice. The decentralization and 
localization recommended could additionally splinter the already fractured 
condition of process and leave it less expert and more parochial. Indeed, 
Professor Walker's prescriptions would apparently exacerbate certain of 
procedure's worst features, principally balkanization, which he most 
vociferously criticizes. 
In sum, his approach may improve process, but the relative paucity of 
dependable empirical data, especially regarding welfare reform' s efficacy 
and applicability to procedural change, complicates assessment of central 
ideas in New Deal's End. The last section, accordingly, provides 
suggestions that should enhance process with means which resemble 
Professor Walker's method but that are less extreme and, thus, potentially 
more effective.113 
111. See Levin, supra note 105, at 1588-93; Tobias, supra note 16, at 1406-09; Tobias, supra 
note 23, at 60-61; infra notes 130-33, 144 and accompanying text 
112. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1284. 
113. See id. at 1290-91. In the end, he does not definitively show that the analogies between 
states and federal districts and between welfare and procedural reform are apposite or that process's 
problems are sufficiently severe to warrant rather extreme solutions. The 50 states are very different 
units of government than the 94 districts with dissimilar purposes, constituencies and relationships 
to the national government Each court is part of a broader system comprising 94 districts which 
ostensibly resolve civil litigation similarly by applying analogous measures. These strictures, their 
revision process, the national, uniform, simple system and the procedures' reform, thus, depart 
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ill. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FuTuRE 
These recommendations warrant comparatively limited examination in 
this response because a number have been explored elsewhere or can be 
felicitously implemented by applying or adjusting approaches which now 
exist or have been analyzed. For example, many scholars have written 
articles on the topics; 114 expert evaluators, such as the RAND Corporation 
and the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), have scrutinized some relevant 
issues;115 and circuit judicial councils, federal districts, and individual 
judges have employed certain of the concepts.116 Moreover, reliance on 
existing or recalibrated mechanisms, including the 1988 JIA's provisions 
for limiting proliferation117 or invocation of previously-broached 
techniques, namely the 1991 proposed revision in Rule 83 for facilitating 
experimentation with promising measures, 118 would apparently improve 
procedure and effectuate much of Professor Walker's method. 
Prescriptions related to the compilation, assessment, and synthesis of 
additional applicable information on current process are also illustrative. 
Writers have proffered quite a few ideas respecting that material.119 Much 
instructive information is correspondingly available, 120 such as the insights 
generated on proliferation by the Local Rules Project's continuing work121 
on mandatory local reform by analyses of CJRA testing, 122 and on opt-outs 
by the Advisory Committee discovery study. Sufficient material exists 
today, even though evaluators could gather and scrutinize greater and more 
reliable information. For instance, there is a wealth of material on the 
seven-year CJRA experiment which deserves collection before it is lost or 
dramatically from the substance, and even the process of, welfare. Managing public assistance or 
entitlement programs differs from resolving federal civil cases or even administering justice in a 
court of law. Finally, the lack of empirical data limits greater exposition of these ideas, while 
modern procedure's more settled state and its enhanced amenability to treatment mean that the 
existing processes explored below should suffice. 
114. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 86; Robel, supra note 48, at 50; Subrin, supra note 22, 
at 2016-18. 
115. See infra notes 122, 128. 
116. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text 
117. See infra note 131 and accompanying text 
118. See supra note 107 and accompanying text 
119. See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Cost and 
Delay to the Markets in Legal Services and Legal Refonn, 39 B.C. L. REV. 597 (1998); Oakley, 
supra note 52, at 437-38; Tobias, supra note 23, at 68-75. 
120. See supra note 17 and accompanying text 
121. See infra note 128. 
122. See, e.g., James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil 
Justice Refonn Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998); Thomas E. Willging et al., An 
Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 
39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998); see also supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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memories of those involved fade, while assessors might refine the large 
quantity of available raw data, such as the information that RAND, the 
FJC, and districts assembled.123 
It would be preferable to base suggestions on the maximum feasible 
amount of dependable, empirical material which expert, independent 
evaluators have systematically compiled, analyzed and synthesized. 
However, I can offer numerous recommendations that could address 
procedure's difficulties which Professor Walker and additional observers 
identify by assuming that they are troubling enough to warrant remediation 
and by relying on the plethora of current information. My proposals also 
can be recalibrated as more material becomes available or as assessors 
refine available information. 
The four changes that the author scrutinizes, and related developments 
which others have examined, have created problems that require treatment. 
These phenomena have essentially undermined the national, uniform, and 
simple trans-substantive regime of the original Federal Rules, which has 
facilitated expeditious, economical and equitable dispute resolution.124 In 
fairness, that characterization is an ideal which Congress, national rule 
revisors, districts, and judges often honored in the breach, while their 
efforts to promote such disposition ironically may have eroded this 
scheme. My suggestions are intended to revitalize and maintain the system 
and the federal amendment process, which have worked well for six 
decades, and to foster application of measures that will address unusual 
local difficulties or whose testing could improve the Rules. The approach, 
therefore, basically employs Professor Walker's method but with less 
potential disruption. Congress can implement most of these ideas, although 
the judiciary, through national and local revision entities, districts, and 
judges, might effectuate many.125 
A The CJRA and Its Expiration 
Congress must definitively resolve the fate of the CJRA that was 
scheduled to expire in 1997. It is unclear whether the Act did sunset then, 
and, thus, whether statutorily-prescribed strictures, which fragmented 
123. See infra note 128; Mullenix, supra note 105, at 683 (finding a "wealth of statistical 
information" on discovery in studies cited in supra note 122). In fairness, little data on welfare 
refonn and its applicability to procedure exist because Congress only reformed welfare in 1996. 
124. See supra note 109 and accompanying text 
125. My ideas may be insufficiently realistic as a political matter. The CJRA and the PSLRA 
further fragmented, and Congress has recently seemed rather unconcerned about the process. 
However, these may be aberrations. The provisions for limiting proliferation in the IlA, Rule 83 
and the 1991 proposal to amend Rule 83 had potential. Thus, the venerable system should be 
permitted to work as originally intended before jettisoning it 
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procedure and complicated civil practice, remain applicable.126 Lawmakers 
should evaluate CJRA testing and identify the mechanisms that were 
sufficiently effective to deserve inclusion in the Federal Rules or 
legislation and those which were less efficacious, yet promising, for 
additional experimentation or for consideration in the national revision 
process. For example, Congress indefinitely extended CJRA case reporting 
mandates related to disposition times in 1997,127 but did not address the 
Act's other aspects, especially whether the measures tested were salutary · 
enough to warrant broader application.128 Once lawmakers have so 
classified the procedures, they must clearly state that the CJRA has expired 
and that districts must eliminate all entities, namely advisory groups, and 
all local provisions invoked thereunder. The courts should abrogate or 
merge those institutions which conflict with existing bodies129 and abolish 
the strictures that violate or duplicate the Federal Rules, statutes, or district 
local rules, even if Congress does not conclusively resolve the CJRA's 
fate. 
These proposals should eliminate many proliferating mechanisms 
which districts and judges prescribed during the 1990s principally pursuant 
to the CJRA. The recommendations would essentially reinstate the 
procedural status quo that obtained when Congress and the Supreme Court 
adopted those features of the 1988 JIA and of Rule 83's 1985 revision 
which they intended to decrease proliferation. 
B. Limiting Local Proliferation Under the JIA and Rule 83 
Circuit judicial councils, district courts, and individual judges must 
implement the provisos in the JIA and the 1985 and 1995 amendments of 
Rule 83 that proscribe local measures which conflict with or repeat the 
Federal Rules, legislation, or district local rules. For instance, courts and 
judges who have yet to effectuate Rule 83' s command that standing orders 
not contravene or duplicate the above provisions should expeditiously 
126. See Judicial Improvements Act ofl 990, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 482(b )(2), 104 Stat. 
5089, 5096; see also Mullenix, supra note 41, at 379. See generally Carl Tobias, Did the Civil 
Justice Refonn Act of 1990 Actually Expire?, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 887 (1998). 
127. See Pub. L. No. 105-53, § 2, 111 Stat. 1173 (1997). 
128. Congress could consult studies and recommendations on the pilot and demonstration 
programs by the Judicial Conference, RAND and the FJC, but they make few conclusive 
suggestions as to specific measures and essentially support reinstating the procedural status quo, 
even though the underlying data collected may be helpful. Congress could also evaluate devices 
tested in the other79 districts. Mechanisms in the general areas of case management, discovery and 
alternatives to dispute resolution seem efficacious, and some particular techniques, such as 
telephonic conferences, save time or money. See Tobias, supra note 44. 
129. Advisory groups realized their purposes and conflict with local rules committees under 
the IlA and, thus, should be abolished or merged with them. See Tobias, supra note 24, at 1628. 
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comply.130 Circuit councils, which have similarly failed to evaluate local 
procedures and abrogate or alter those that are inconsistent or repetitive as 
the JIA and Rule 83' s 1995 revision mandate, 131 must promptly do so. The 
councils could capitalize on the Ninth Circuit's efficacious discharge of 
these responsibilities.132 The court's careful scrutiny of fifteen districts' 
strictures indicates that other councils might attain analogous success, 
particularly if Congress appropriates funds for monitoring and the CJRA, 
which essentially suspended the commands' implementation, expires. 
Should the duties' performance not improve because authoritY to eliminate 
or change violative measures is overly diffuse or councils lack the resolve 
or resources to increase uniformity, Congress might consider more extreme 
approaches, such as a standing committee on local procedures which could 
police proliferation rather rigorously through centralized oversight.133 
The effectuation of these recommendations would reduce conflicting 
and redundant local requirements that existed in 1988 and measures that 
courts or judges have applied since then outside the context of CJRA 
experimentation. The suggestions should contribute to the revival and 
maintenance of the federal rule amendment process and of a national, 
uniform, simple trans-substantive procedural regime. 
C. Additional Suggestions for Improving National 
Revision and Modem Procedure 
A number of additional actions could improve the federal revision 
process and current procedure. The institutions which study the Rules and 
develop proposed amendments, Congress, district courts, and judges must 
make the needs of the civil justice system paramount, exercise appropriate 
restraint, and cooperate more when modifying procedure.134 For example, 
the national revisors ought to recommend, and lawmakers should acquiesce 
in, rule changes that will best serve all whom litigation affects. The rule 
amendment entities should also honor the citizen participation mandates 
in the JIA and Rule 83 by seeking and scrutinizing the greatest possible 
input of applicable interests when considering suggested alterations, while 
they must be alert to and reject the efforts of those who could secure 
strategic or other advantages from modifications.135 
130. See FED. R. ClV. P. 83(b); see also FED. R. ClV. P. 83, 1985 advisory comm. note. 
131. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 2071(a),(c) (1994); FED. R. ClV. P. 83, 1995 amendment 
132. See DISTRICT LocAL RULES REVIEW COMMl'ITEE, REPoRT TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1997). See generally Tobias, supra note 19, at 79. 
133. See Tobias, supra note 23, at 79. 
134. See id. at 77. 
135. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073 (1994); FED. R. ClV. P. 83; see also Hughes, supra note 
37, at 1-4 (finding much input in 1993 revision process); Tobias, supra note 24, at 1599-1601 
(analyzing mandates). But cf. Mullenix, supra note 21, at 830 (analyzing mandates' problems). 
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The national revisors might also revitalize and sustain the federal 
amendment process and the national, consistent, simple scheme by 
recapturing primary responsibility for procedural change. One helpful 
means of doing so is to rescind the local option provisions which govern 
discovery in the 1993 Federal Rules modifications, an endeavor that the 
Standing Committee has already initiated.136 The strictures undermine 
national entities and processes and the Federal Rules, 137 while the revisors, 
by prescribing opt-outs, may have evinced insufficient commitment, and 
even indifference, to preserving a national, uniform code of procedure.138 
Reviving and perpetuating the federal amendment process and the 
national, consistent, simple regime will correspondingly require that 
Congress accord greater deference to federal revision and be more 
restrained when making procedural policy than it recently has.139 Solons 
should refrain from directly amending the Rules and only modify proposals 
developed through the extensive revision process which they find clearly 
unwarranted.140 Lawmakers must accede to the national amendment 
institutions that have accumulated much relevant expertise, especially 
regarding effective procedures, while the entities are ostensibly less 
political and recommend revisions which are best for the civil justice 
system.141 Deference is concomitantly indicated because rule amendment 
is an important, if not a core, judicial responsibility, even though the 
Constitution and the Rules Enabling Act recognize Congress's interest in 
revision.142 
Lawmakers should also limit their procedural policymaking. The 
CJRA's passage epitomized that phenomenon, and many judges 
considered the Act an ill-advised attempt of a co-equal branch to 
micromanage the courts.143 Congress must insert fewer strictures in 
statutes, and it might even delete existing requirements, namely the 
PSLRA's commands related to class actions, as they undercut the federal 
136. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Congress or districts could abrogate opt-outs 
or local rules adopted thereunder, but respect for federal revision suggests deference. 
137. Expiration of the CJRA, which was a major reason for opt-outs' inclusion in the 1993 
federal revisions, and adoption of Rule 83's 1991 proposed revision should obviate the need for 
opt-outs. See supra notes 52-53, 126-29, infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
138. See, e.g., Oakley, supra note 52, at 437-38; Robel, supra note 48, at 50; Tobias, supra 
note 23, at 64. But see Carrington, supra note 52, at 304-06. For more ideas on recapturing 
responsibility, see Oakley, supra note 52, at 446-48; Tobias, supra note 23, at 77-79; supra notes 
134-35, infra note 144. 
139. See Tobias, supra note 24, at 1627-28. 
140. See id. 
141. See id. 
142. See U.S. CONST. art. ill,§§ 1-2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994). 
143. See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 78, at 99; Mullenix, supra note 41, at 399-401; Robel, supra 
note 40, at 1450. But see Biden, supra note 43. 
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amendment process and the national, uniform, simple, trans-substantive 
scheme. However, solons should prescribe procedure when important 
policy reasons or questions of authority warrant congressional action. One 
trenchant example is a 1991 change in Federal Rule 83, which would have 
empowered districts that secured Judicial Conference approval to test 
conflicting local measures for five years, but which the national revisors 
retracted in deference to ongoing CJRA implementation.144 This tempered 
approach deserves legislative adoption because it carefully balances the 
need for constructive experimentation with proliferation's restriction and 
because Congress is the preferable entity to authorize departures from the 
JIA' s prohibition on inconsistent and redundant local mechanisms.145 
Districts and individual judges could correspondingly promote the 
rejuvenation and maintenance of the national amendment process and the 
procedural regime by limiting their erosion which proliferating strictures 
effect.146 For instance, courts and judges should cease prescribing new, and 
abolish or alter current, requirements that contravene or repeat Federal 
Rules, statutes, or district local rules, unless they must treat peculiar 
problems which those provisions do not address or experiment with 
measures that will enhance process.147 Of course, the 1991 proposed 
change in Rule 83 would be responsive to these contingencies.148 
The above suggestions should improve federal revision and procedure 
in many ways. For example, both might be revitalized and sustained if 
Congress exercised more restraint in the amendment process and in making 
procedural policy. The system of centrally coordinated testing would foster 
promising experimentation, could reduce duplicative research as well as 
conflicting and redundant district strictures, and should vitiate the need for 
opt-outs. This scheme would also effectuate several features, such as 
increased local control and mandatory research, of Professor Walker's 
method with less disturbance of longstanding, efficacious arrangements. 
N. CONCLUSION 
New Deal's End significantly advances comprehension of modem 
federal civil procedure. I have attempted to elaborate Professor Walker's 
informative description and to recommend more felicitous means for 
achieving the goal of his provocative prescriptions. If those responsible for 
144. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
145. See Levin, supra note 105, at 1585-86; Tobias, supra note 24, at 1616; see also supra 
note 32 and accompanying text (analyzing procedures Congress included in statutes). 
146. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text; see also Tobias, supra note 19. 
147. See FED. R. Civ. P. l, 83; see also sµpra notes 109, 124, 129-32 & 136. 
148. See supra notes 107, 144-45 and accompanying text. 
666 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [VoLSl 
process implement my suggestions, they can improve procedure at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. 
